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"The Mystery of Apriority# 
A priori and Time in Heidegger$s Thought 
 
István M. FEHÉR  
Eötvös Loránd University/ 
Andrassy German Speaking University, Budapest 
 
Keywords: a priori, time, Being, being and time, Heidegger, Kant, Descartes, aletheia, 
logics, existential analytic, destruction 
 
Abstract: The concept of a priori does not belong to Heidegger's favourite or most 
familiar concepts. Unlike concepts such as, e.g., Sein, physis, ousia, idea, aletheia, etc., 
it is not given detailed discussions in his works. When it occurs # mostly in the 1920s # 
it has the usual meaning it has come to obtain in early modern philosophy ever since 
Kant. A characteristic occurrence of the term crops up in his main work: !<A-priorism' 
is the method of every scientific philosophy which understands itself." (!Der 
»Apriorismus« ist die Methode jeder wissenschaftlichen Philosophie, die sich selbst 
versteht" (Sein und Zeit, p. 50 = Being and Time, trans. John Macquarrie & Edward 
Robinson, p. 490, note x). To claim that this concept does not rank in Heidegger's 
innermost vocabulary is, however, not to claim that he totally ignored or overlooked it. 
On the contrary: Heidegger was well aware that this concept is closely related to two of 
his most central concepts or themes: those of time and # through it # to Being. # The 
paper proposes to explore these dimensions in subsequent steps. First it is shown that, in 
his critical confrontation of Husserl's phenomenology, Heidegger appreciated very 
much Husserl's efforts to reconstruct !the original sense of a priori" by disengaging it 
from the subject. Heidegger takes up and radicalizes Husserl's effort to de-subjectivate 
this concept in claiming that a priori is a designation of being. Towards the end of the 
1927 lecture course (=GA 24) Heidegger comes to expand on the theme more in detail. 
He says that the original sense of a priori in terms of !earlier" contains a clear reference 
to time; it is, therefore, a temporal determination. He claims that earlier than any 
possible !earlier" is time or temporality. This makes it possible to speak meaningfully 
about something such as !earlier" at all.  Time may, accordingly, be called to be the 
!earliest" of everything that may come !earlier"# it is, indeed, the a priori of all possible 
a prioris, preceding these and making them possible. On the other hand, preceding all 
beings is being as such. Being is !earlier" than beings. From this perspective, Being is 
the absolute a priori. A priori is then both a temporal and an ontological concept. Time, 
however, understood in terms of its relation to being, is not to be accounted for by and 
in terms of the common concept of time in the sense of intratemporality. Philosophy as 
an a priori science is both an ontological and a temporal science, and that is what 
Heidegger's main thesis according to which Being and Time belong together comes 
down to. # In subsequent parts of the paper a possible objection is examined at some 
length, namely, whether it is not a misunderstanding, on Heidegger's part, to claim that 
!earlier" is always and in any case a !temporal" determination, whether, in other words, 
one could not # and indeed, should not # rather make a distinction between !temporal" 
and !logical" sequence or succession. This objection is countered with reference to the 
fact that, in order to reasonably formulate the dichotomy temporal#logical, one must 
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tacitly presuppose a restricted, that is, non-Heideggerian concept of time. A final 
dilemma emerges with regard to whether and to what extent Heidegger's assumption of 
his radically new concept of time can legitimately be linked to (or opposed to) 
traditional concepts of time # a dilemma pretty much the same as the ones regarding 
whether and to what extent his radically new concepts, e.g., of history and being, can be 
linked to, and derived from, a critical confrontation (=destruction) of the philosophical 
tradition. This dilemma is claimed to pertain to the linguistic dimension of philosophy 
(that is, of how, with what conceptuality a philosopher addresses or names his subject 







The concept of a priori does not belong to Heidegger's characteristic or favourite 
philosophical concepts. Although I am not aware that he ever criticized it I do not know 
of his ever discussing this concept in detail either # the way he did with several other 
central notions of philosophy (e.g. physis, ousia, idea, aletheia, being), which he tried to 
deconstruct taking them to their elements by means of the procedure characteristic to his 
approach known as phenomenological-hermeneutical destruction, then investing them 
with new meaning by appropriating them anew, winning them back. 
The concept of a priori was used by Heidegger # mainly in the 1920s # not 
seldom and mostly as an obvious, philosophically accepted interpretative notion without 
greater emphasis1 In his main work, Being and Time, this expression occurs 
approximately a dozen times (as an adjective; as other derived forms two-three dozen 
times), in most cases it appears in not too specific contexts. Though a footnote contains 
the significant statement that !<A-priorism' is the method of every scientific philosophy 
which understands itself",2 this committing statement on the one hand is formulated with 
self-evident obviousness, on the other hand, the word is put between quotation marks, 
which could be rendered approximately as: !That which is called <a-priorism' 
(customarily in philosophy) is..." The use of quotation marks in other cases expresses a 
stronger distantiation, irony, or criticism; in the present case it presumably conveys a 
moderate distance. Heidegger seems to suggest that he used the expression more or less 
in the same sense as the philosophical tradition or contemporary philosophy does; 
although it was not his own expression and was a borrowing (presumably from Neo-
                                                 
1 GA 56/57, 36; GA 60, 21. # Bibliographical note: I refer to the complete works of Heidegger 
(Gesamtausgabe, Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann, 1975 ff.) by using the abbreviation GA; this 
is followed by the volume number, and after a comma by the page number. # Other 
abbreviations: SZ = Heidegger, Sein und Zeit, 15th edition, (Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1979); BT = 
Being and Time, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (New York: Harper & Row, 1962). If 
there are references to both the original German text and the corresponding English translation the 
German pagination and the English pagination are separated by a slash. For example: >SZ 10 / BT 
30,> >GA 20, 417 / 301f.,> the number before the slash indicating the German edition, the one after 
the slash the English edition. 
2 SZ 50: !Der »Apriorismus« ist die Methode jeder wissenschaftlichen Philosophie, die sich 
selbst versteht."  
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Kantianism and/or phenomenology1), he had no particular objection against it. When he 
defined philosophy as an a priori science, more often than not he did not discuss in 
detail in what sense he used the concept of a priori, but this, in my opinion, is not 
enough ground for an objection; this would only be justified if this concept played a 
particular part in his thinking. 
The claim that the concept of a priori does not belong among Heidegger's 
characteristic or more thoroughly discussed philosophical notions, that his attention was 
not concentrated on it for long, does not mean, however, that he completely neglected or 
ignored it. Heidegger was well aware that this concept could be naturally and closely 
connected with a central concept or theme of his thought: time (and through it with 
another characteristic theme of his thinking, Being). In the 1920s he did not fail to draw 
attention to this on several occasions. In what follows, I should like to dwell on the 
analysis and reconstruction of this correlation. 
 
II. 
Heidegger began to give deeper, theoretical-critical consideration to Husserl's 
phenomenology after World War I, and for approximately a decade, that is, until the 
publication of his main work, Being and Time in 1927 # and in a certain sense even in 
the years that followed after # it stood in the foreground of his efforts as a thinker. The 
most exhaustive, most thorough phase of this persistent intellectual confrontation with 
Husserl's phenomenology was beyond doubt the lecture course held on the concept of 
time in 1925, which was published as volume 20 of the Complete Works, and in which 
the critical analysis of Husserl's phenomenology covers almost two hundred pages 
under the title !preliminary part". Heidegger discussed here !the original sense of a 
priori" as one of the basic discoveries of phenomenology, and he gave credit to 
phenomenology for detaching the concept of a priori from the subject, from cognition, 
whereby it was made possible for us to find the a priori both in the ideal (categorial) and 
in the real sphere.2 In a short retrospect he alluded to the fact that in its original sense the 
notion means !earlier" (we call a priori in something that which is previous in or on it, 
this being a merely formal definition), and that only during early modernity (in 
Descartes, and in a more definite manner in Kant) did it acquire the meaning !earlier 
with regard to cognition", namely, in the sense that it does not originate from empirical, 
inductive experience; the a priori (cognition) has thus been taking on the meaning of 
what is !independent of experience".3 By having been linked to cognition, the a priori 
                                                 
1 See, e.g., Edmund Husserl: Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen 
Philosophie. Erstes Buch. Allgemeine Einführung in die reine Phänomenologie, neu hrsg. von 
Karl Schuhmann. 1. Halbband. Text der 1.-3. Auflage. Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff, 1976 (= 
Husserliana, Band III/1), 8: !phenomenology must be here grounded as a science of essence, as 
an <a-prioristic' or eidetic science" (![...] die Phänomenologie hier als eine Wesenswissenschaft # 
als eine !apriorische" oder, wie wir auch sagen, eidetische Wissenschaft begründet werden soll 
[...]"). Husserl at the same time mentioned somewhat later: because of the ambiguity and unclear 
vagueness the expressions a priori, a posteriori are charged with these days, and because of the 
dubious teachings with which they have been interwoven as the burdensome legacy of the past, if 
it is possible, he avoided using them (Ibid.). 
2 GA 20, 100 ff. 
3 Even in Husserl, who in fact initiated the revision of the early modern usage of the concept we 
can encounter the !apriorische oder empirische" alternative; see Edmund Husserl, Logische 
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has come to be linked to the subject as well, and it is the priority of subjectivity 
characteristic to modern philosophy taht in this association comes to the fore. Even 
nowadays, observed Heidegger, the a priori assumes a character which belongs 
specifically to the internal sphere.1 Phenomenology, by contrast, has expanded the 
concept of a priori, and made it universal. The a priori in fact designates being (!Titel 
des Seins"), Heidegger affirmed meaningfully; it is !earlier" neither with respect to the 
order of cognition, nor to the order of being # it regards much rather the order in which 
the being of  beings is structured (!Aufbaufolge").2 
 The 1925 lecture course contains only a perfunctory note referring to the fact 
that !to clarify the meaning of" the a priori !it is necessary to understand exactly that 
which we are looking for # time", and this is already revealed by the name (!earlier"), as 
this designation hides some kind of time sequence, order (!Zeitfolge").3 Towards the 
end of the lecture course entitled The Basic Problems of Phenomenology, which was 
held two years later, in the same year when Heidegger's main work was published, he 
discussed the relationship between the a priori and time openly and in some detail. 
Since according to the title of the first part of his main work (more exactly the second 
part of the title) time appears as !the transcendental horizon of the question of Being", 
ontology # said Heidegger # is basically a temporal science, and because ontological 
statements are temporal statements, they are at the same time a priori statements as 
well.4 Now, by introducing the a priori into the ontological sphere, Heidegger may 
legitimately be claimed to have continued and in his own way also radicalized Husserl's 
attempt to de-subjectivate the a priori. This recognition may help us to explain the brief 
allusion figuring in the above quoted note of the main work as well. If we have said 
above that when defining philosophy as an a priori science in his main work he did not 
discuss in detail in what particular sense he used the concept of a priori, now we can 
add to this the specification: Heidegger used the a priori notion in a decidedly 
ontological (that is not in the modern#Neo-Kantian) sense. 
 If the a priori means !earlier" or !former", explained Heidegger in somewhat 
greater detail in his lecture of 1927, then # provided !earlier"/!former" is a !time 
determination"5 (since !earlier", !former" obviously means !earlier" in time, !former" 
in time) # that which is earlier than the !earlier" # that which precedes the !earlier", and 
thus makes it thereby possible # is nothing else than time itself. That which !is earlier 
than any possible earlier", that which makes the earlier possible (i.e., that which makes 
                                                                                                                                    
Untersuchungen, Erster Band, Prolegomena zur reinen Logik, Fünfte Auflage (Tübingen: Max 
Niemeyer Verlag, 1968), 33. See Ibid., 62: !Kein Naturgesetz ist a priori erkennbar, ist selbst 
einsichtig begründbar. Der einzige Weg, ein solches Gesetz zu begründen und zu rechtfertigen, 
ist die Induktion aus einzelnen Tatsachen der Erfahrung", where the a priori is similarly opposed 
to the !Erfahrung". See also Ibid., 178: !Es ist ein wesentlicher, schlechthin unüberbrückbarer 
Unterschied zwischen Idealwissenschaften und Realwissenschaften. Die ersteren sind apriorisch, 
die letzteren empirisch."; 238.: ![...] und zwar a priori, ohne jede Rücksicht auf die empirische 
Besonderheit des menschlichen Erkennens in seinen psychologischen Bedingtheiten [...]". 
1 See for example Husserl's characteristic expression: !Bewußtseinsapriori"; Ideen, Husserliana, 
Band III/1, 135. 
2 GA 20, 101 ff. 
3 GA 20, 99. 
4 GA 24, 461 / 324. 
5 For what follows see GA 24, 461 ff. / 324 ff. 
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it possible for there being something such as !earlier" or !later" at all) is in fact time. 
Without time there is no a priori, or we could also say, interpreting Heidegger's words: 
time is the a priori of the a priori. That which precedes any earlier or later whatsoever is 
nothing else than time # of course, time understood in its ontological and not in its 
vulgar or subjective sense.1 Time is earlier compared to any possible earlier, it is earlier 
than any possible earlier, because it is the basic condition of the possibility of any 
earlier, time is therefore the earliest.2 If we understand the a priori ontologically, then 
from this perspective the first or the earliest is Being. As Heidegger formulated a year 
later: !Being is earlier than beings; this <earlier than' is a distinguishing <feature' [...]. 
Being is earlier-than, is that which is essentially <earlier'; it belongs to what is prior, in 
the language of later ontology: a priori."3 If the a priori is a character of Being, and if 
the a priori is at the same time a time determination, but time is related to Being, then 
there is an inner relationship between the a priori and temporality, he added.4 The 1927 
lecture course in this respect formulates in a way that recalls the complaint referring to 
the forgottenness of being elaborated on in the first pages of the main work: !Being has 
the character of the prius which the human being, who is familiar first and foremost 
merely with beings, has forgotten. The liberation of the fettered cave dwellers from the 
cave and their turning around to the light is nothing but a drawing oneself back from this 
oblivion to the recollection of the prius, in which there lies enclosed the enabling of 
understanding being itself."5 The recollection of this forgotten earlier is therefore 
anamnesis, remembrance. What it should come down to, Heidegger claims, is !to 
penetrate further into the mystery of apriority [die Rätsel der Apriorität]",6 but this was 
no more undertaken by the lecture # the former quotation must have been said during 
one of the last classes, probably during the very last. At a former stage of the temporal 
interpretation Heidegger made this unexpected remark: !We are not well enough 
prepared to penetrate into this obscure region."7 It may be a legitimate claim to say that 
this statement could have been uttered with equal right at the end of semester related to 
the !mystery of apriority".8 
                                                 
1 Heidegger emphasized even in the 1960s that: !Ever attempt which tries to consider adequately 
the relationship between Being and time by means of the common and approximate notions of 
the time and Being concepts, soon will get entangled into the inextricable mesh of little thought-
out relations." [Zur Sache des Denkens, 2nd ed. (Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1976), 2.: !Jeder Versuch, 
das Verhältnis von Sein und Zeit mit Hilfe der landläufigen und ungefähren Vorstellungen von 
Zeit und Sein hinreichend zu denken, verstrickt sich alsbald in ein unentwirrbares Geflecht kaum 
durchdachter Beziehungen."] 
2 The following passage of the main work refers implicitly to the relationship between the a 
priori and time: !»Früher« als jede daseinsmäßige Voraussetzung und Verhaltung ist das 
»Apriori« der Seinsverfassung in der Seinsart der Sorge". (SZ 43a. §., 260.) 
3 GA 26, 184 / 146. 
4 GA 26, 189. 
5 GA 24, 465 / 326f. 
6 GA 24, 465 / 327. (My italics I. M. F.) 
7 GA 24, 443 / 312.  
8 It will be useful to support the analyses of the lectures of 1927 and 1928, summed up only in 
great lines and illustrated by short quotations, with longer quotes in the original language. See 
GA 24, 463: !Weil das ursprünglich Ermöglichende, der Ursprung von Möglichkeit selbst, die 
Zeit ist, zeitigt sich die Zeit selbst als das Früheste schlechthin. Früher als jedes mögliche Früher 
irgendwelcher Art ist die Zeit, weil sie Grundbedingung für ein Früher überhaupt ist. Und weil 
Philobiblon Vol XV (2010) 
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 If we look back to the main work from here, we arrive to a closer understanding 
of what Heidegger meant when he defined philosophy as an a priori science. 
Considering the above discussed analyses of the lectures it becomes clear that the entire 
work, Being and Time, consists of a priori analyses; the quoted characterization is hence 
self-characterization. Glancing back at the end of the 1927 lecture course, Heidegger 
said by expressions he used in the lecture such as !already before", !already always", 
etc. (!immer schon", !vorgängig schon", !im vorhinein", !zuvor schon") (these 
expressions, let us add, occur similarly often, so that they have become philosophical 
common knowledge as expressions characteristic to Heidegger's thinking and 
language): !In using all of these temporal, really Temporal. terms we have in mind 




The conference the original version of this paper was presented at had as its subject the 
history of Hungarian philosophy, in the self-characterization of which often figures the #
in fact underrating, belittling # belief that the Hungarian language is not quite suitable 
for philosophy. The latent temporal determination of Being is a central thesis and 
constant incentive to Heidegger's philosophical path; this determination being described 
by Heidegger with the concept of Anwesen, Anwesenheit. To translate Anwesen is of 
course a laborious task, and the Hungarian language is no more able to cope with it than 
any other foreign language. But it is not, however, completely unsuitable, I believe, to 
represent the expression's dimensions of meaning, their multitude and 
interconnectedness # at any rate, it is far less unsuitable than several other languages. 
Seeing the persistently repeated thesis of the Hungarian language's unsuitability for 
philosophy it would be all the more important to dedicate at this point some space (or 
should we say, some time), in the form of a brief excursus, to the problem of rendering 
in Hungarian the Heideggerian issue of time. 
 The explanation of the concept Anwesenheit, as well as of the verbal anwesen, 
west... an, expressing for Heidegger the temporal determinedness of Being, may be 
based on the notions similar in form Ankommen, Ankunft, kommt ... an (a hypothesis I 
have had several occasions to discuss with German colleagues, and though it was not 
                                                                                                                                    
die Zeit als Quelle aller Ermöglichungen (Möglichkeiten) das Früheste ist, sind aller 
Möglichkeiten als solche in ihrer Ermöglichungsfunktion vom Charakter des Früher, d.h. 
apriori." (Emphases from the original.) Cf. also GA 26, 184: !Sein ist früher als das Seiende; 
dieses <früher als', das dem Sein zugesprochen wird, ist eine ausgezeichnete <Bestimmung' [...] 
Sein ist früher als, ist das wesenhaft <Frühere', es ist von früher her, in der Sprache der späteren 
Ontologie: a priori. Alles ontologische Fragen ist ein Fragen nach dem und ein Bestimmen des 
<Apriori'. # <Früher als', das ist doch offenbar eine Zeitbestimmung: Kein früher ohne Zeit. 
Früher als jedes mögliche <Früher als' ist aber die Zeit$ Mithin: wenn Sein próteron, a priori ist, 
dann steht es in einem ursprünglichen Zusammenhang mit Zeit. Allerdings, was hier <früher', 
d.h. was Zeit besagt, bleibt dunkel # und völlig rätselhaft, wenn man mit dem vulgären 
Zeitbegriff auszukommen versucht." See also GA 21, 414.: ?Das Dasein ist je schon früher das, 
als was es de facto jeweils ist. Früher aber denn jedes mögliche Früher ist die Zeit selbst, die es 
macht, daß Dasein so etwas wie Möglichkeit seiner selbst sein kann." ?[Das Schon] ist eine 
temporale Bestimmung, die jeder Zeit und Seinsfaktizität des Daseins zukommt. Das Schon ist 
die Indikation des Apriori der Faktizität".   
1 GA 24, 461 / 324. 
Philobiblon Vol XV (2010) 
 17
unanimously approved, it was neither unanimously rejected), all the more, as Heidegger 
himself, with reference to Being, sometimes connected the Anwesen and the 
Ankommen.1 Now, Ankommen can be translated to Hungarian by two verbal forms # 
besides others #, !megjön" and !eljön". !Megjön" # this means: it has come and it is 
here. This is not simple being here (eternally), being present: who has come (?megjött"), 
is not simply here (as if s/he had ever been here) # but s/he is here by having come, 
having arrived. S/he is here, because s/he has come, or in other words: s/he has come 
and s/he is here. Because of this, on the other hand, it cannot be true that s/he is no 
longer here, that s/he came, but s/he has already left. (If I ask: !Has the guest comeX" 
and the answer is affirmative, then I presume that s/he is still there, and I enter the room 
to greet him/her. If I look for him/her in vain, because s/he has already left, then I 
presume I did not receive the adequate answer to my question, which in this case ought 
to have been the following: !Yes, s/he arrived, but s/he was here only for a short while, 
s/he has already left.") This dynamics # a process and a result at the same time # 
working in the verb !megjönni", I believe, is adequate (if not to translate exactly, at 
least) to convey the approximate meaning of Heidegger's concept Sein als Anwesenheit 
and the dynamics of !west an", !kommt an" lying in this. 
 The !megjön"#!eljön" pair in Hungarian is able to express, beyond this, 
extremely slight differences or nuances in meaning. We say for example: !megjött a 
tavasz" (spring has arrived), on the other hand it is usually said: !eljött az Ęsz" (autumn 
has come). Though grammatically the opposite would also be correct, however, our 
using these expressions more or less means that we are glad of spring's arrival, while we 
are resigned to the coming of autumn (!az idén is eljött az Ęsz" # !autumn has come this 
year as well"). The first lines of Petrarca's sonnet entitled Zefiro torna have been 
translated by György Sárközy in this way: !A szép idĘt a langy szél visszahozta, s 
megjött családja is, füvek, virágok, csicsergĘ fecskék, búgó csalogányok..." (The good 
weather has been brought back by the gentle wind, and his family, herbs, flowers, 
twittering swallows and cooing nightingales have come...). The expression !megjött a 
tavasz" refers to an event which happens once; it is more emphatic than !eljött". Of 
course, who has come (!eljött"), is also here, as well as the person who has come 
(!megjött"), but the latter's coming (!eljövetel"), and his/her resulting presence seems 
nevertheless more emphasized. 
 Let us select some further examples. !Örülök, hogy eljöttél" (I am glad you 
have come), I say to a visitor (and not: megjöttél, which means: you have arrived). 
!Megjöttek a vendégek" (the guests have arrived), !megjöttek a konferencia részvevĘi" 
(the participants of the conference have arrived) # could have been said here, in this 
                                                 
1 See Heidegger, Identität und Differenz (Pfullingen: Neske, 1957), 23: !Denn erst der Mensch, 
offen für das Sein, läßt dieses als Anwesen ankommen." Ibid. 62: !Sein west hier in der Weise 
eines Überganges zum Seienden. [...] Ankunft heißt: sich bergen in Unverborgenheit [...]" (In the 
same place the expression !sich bergende Ankunft" appears twice more, then four times 
!Ankunft" figures without the attribute; see also ibid. 66.). However, for us the most important 
occurrence is on page 65, where !Ankunft" is followed by !Anwesen" in brackets, thus: ![...] 
insofern wir an [...] Übergang (Transzendenz) und Ankunft (Anwesen) denken". The expressions 
figuring between parentheses can be understood as the synonyms, explanations of the preceding 
words. See also GA 60, 102. o.: ?Im klassischen Griechisch bedeutete parousia 'Ankunft' 
(Anwesenheit) [...]". Cf. also Identität und Differenz, 68:  !Eines kommt im anderen an" (see 
now GA 11, 71 ff.). 
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guest-house an hour ago; while !Eljöttek a vendégek, a konferencia részvevĘi" in itself, 
grammatically would not be incorrect, but it would mean something completely 
different, and it would be probably misleading to express ourselves thus. [The 
organizers of the conference, however, are glad that the participants have come (eljöttek) 
to the conference.] Then: !Megjött Rómából" (S/he has come back from Rome = has 
come back, because s/he lives here, or because s/he started from here), and !eljött 
Rómából" (S/he has come from Rome # to visit us, as s/he stays, lives there). 
!Megjöttek a gyerekek" (The children have come # home; they live with us), and !eljöt-
tek a gyerekek" (The children have come # to visit us; they are grown up and live apart 
from us). !Megjött" (not always, but) in most cases is an event happening only once; 
!eljött" can be an event happening only once, but also one of several occurrences. 
Concerning the letter, the check, the parcel, the present we say: it has come (!megjött", 
and not: !eljött"). Santa Claus has arrived (!Megjött a Jézuska"), but: Christmas has 
come (!eljött a karácsony"). On the other hand: !Eljött az ideje annak..." (not: megjött #  
The time has come for...). !Hetente kétszer eljött hozzánk" (He would come to us twice 
a week), !Gyere el gyakrabban" (Come more often) # in these cases it would be out of 
the question, it would be grotesque to use !megjön". If we say !megjött a városból" 
(s/he has come from town), this is equally adequate as: !eljött a városból" # 
nevertheless, there is an important difference in the meaning (in the first case s/he !has 
arrived home", in the second !s/he has come for a visit" is the implicit meaning).1 The 
verbs !megérkezik # elérkezik" (to arrive) can express partly similar, partly different 
rich nuances of meaning. 
 We can end this excursus with the following remark: Hungarian language may 
not able to translate by a single word the temporal character of Being presumed by 
Heidegger # there being a similar difficulty in the other languages as well #, but to 
render the idea is, however, in its power, it is not an insurmountable difficulty for it; we 
could also say: it is not deficient in linguistic means to this effect. 
 
IV. 
It is, however, time to face an objection which might legitimately be raised against 
Heidegger's considerations reconstructed above. According to this, two things are here # 
probably unacceptably # mixed, merged; two things which ought to be differentiated. 
For we use the word !earlier" basically in different meanings. It is one thing to say 
about something that it is earlier in time, and another to say that it is earlier not 
temporally, but from another point of view, for example !logically." Thus it is a 
common practice in introductory classes of logic to state that the premises precede the 
conclusions, to which it is added with ritualistic pedantry that !of course, not in time, 
but <logically'". 
 This objection could be answered from Heidegger's point of view by pointing 
out that the objection keeps in view a certain concept of time; a concept of time which is 
opposed to the notion of !logical", that is, the objection is tacitly based on, relies on, and 
works with the dichotomy temporal#logical. It is only from the horizon of a non-
                                                 
1 I have taken the last example from the 4th volume of A magyar nyelv értelmezĘ szótára (The 
Explicative Dictionary of the Hungarian Language) (Budapest: Akadémiai, 1961), 1082. The 
following opposition is very eloquent: !megjött az új munkatárs" (the new colleague has come # 
has begun working with us) # !eljött az új munkatárs" (the new colleague has come # over from 
the other building, s/he paid us a visit). 
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Heideggerian time conception, called by Heidegger vulgar, that objections against time 
understood in terms of the a priori of the a priori can be formulated The rigid 
differentiation, distinction between temporal and logical, is however, according to 
Heidegger, problematic, moreover, untenable. The temporal and the logical, from 
Heidegger's point of view, are not situated on the same level; therefore they cannot get 
into opposition with or exclude one another. The former, as the highest definition of 
human Dasein essentially precedes the latter # this means that it does not exclude it, but 
(as something derivative) it includes it in itself. As Heidegger explicitly formulated it at 
one point in the Being and Time: !the <logic' of logos is rooted in the existential analytic 
of Dasein".1 And Dasein is in the final analysis time. Thus, we could say: time precedes 
logic, compared to this, it is a priori; in other words, time is the a priori of logic.2 
 From Heidegger's phenomenological-hermeneutical perspective, logic is rooted 
in the logos; Greek ontology is claimed to have oriented from the beginning the 
structure of logos to the statement, the apophantic logos # its gaze was mostly directed 
to this, while it neglected other forms (for example request, demand, wish) of the logos 
(as speech) #, and thus it gave life to a certain, still extant !logic" and an ontology (and 
last but not least, a grammar) correlated to it. Thus it becomes understandable why # as 
Heidegger wrote at the end of the Introduction of his main work # fundamental ontology 
lacks !usually not only words, but first of all <grammar'".3 Whatever the linguistic 
difficulties of expounding on fundamental ontology and existential analytic may be, 
from Heidegger's point of view it is certain that: the (logical) !proposition" (and then 
any kind of its transformation into a calculus) originates, in an existential-ontological 
sense, from !interpretation" and !understanding", which are, on their part, the 
fundamental modes of being of human Dasein. This then accounts for the claim that !the 
<logic' of logos is rooted in the existential analytic of Dasein". Heidegger's investigation 
in the later part of the book # within the framework of the existential concept of science 
differentiated from the logical one # is therefore directed to !the ontological genesis of 
the theoretical approach".4 Analyzing this, Heidegger formulated some statements very 
important for our reasoning: !The as-structure [i.e. the as-structure of understanding # I. 
M. F.] is ontologically rooted in the temporality of the Dasein." !The !as" # like 
understanding and interpretation in general # is rooted in the extatic-horizontal unity of 
temporality".5 
 The relationship between the a priori and time has an important role in Kant 
too. According to Kant time and space are the a priori form of sensibility, the twelve 
categories are also a priori # not !in time" of course, but as conditions of possibility: 
conditions which are beyond (or hither) experience, preceding it and making it possible. 
But Kant also operates with a well defined concept of time. This is, though a priori,  
                                                 
1 SZ 160 / BT 203. Heidegger approaches the essence of language from the direction of 
discourse; and this is nothing else than the tuned-understood Being-in-the-World !getting to 
speak". 
2 See to this GA 24, 185: !earlier" must not be understood logically or ontically. (Cf. ibid., 186.) 
3 Heidegger, SZ 39 / BT 63.  
4 See Ibid., 68b.§.,  356 ff. 
5 Ibid., 359: !Die Als-Struktur gründet ontologisch in der Zeitlichkeit des Verstehens".  See ibid., 
360: !Das »Als« gründet wie Verstehen und Auslegen überhaupt in der ekstatisch-horizontalen 
Einheit der Zeitlichkeit" (emphasis in the original). (See BT 411: ?Like understanding and 
interpretation in general, the 'as' is grounded in the ecstatico-horizonal unity of temporality.") 
Philobiblon Vol XV (2010) 
 20
!subjective". Heidegger's concept of time, on the other hand, is different from all 
traditional concepts of time, it is more radical than any of them (he called them 
!vulgar"), a concept related to existence, a concept !from" which we understand 
existence. We understand it from time # this means: time is that which in a certain sense 
makes existence possible (of course, it does not precede it, they are rather born at the 
same moment # the late Heideggerian term Ereignis refers to this belonging together). 
 The comparison with Kant deserves more detailed discussion. # If according to 
our former formulation, from Heidegger's perspective, time precedes logic, and 
compared to it is a priori, in other words, if time is the a priori of logic, then in Kant's 
case the situation is in a certain sense the reverse. The a priori in Kant seems to precede 
time, as it were, for, though time as the !pure form of sensibility" is !given a priori",1 it 
is given as a !form of inner intuition", as !the subjective condition under which all 
intuitions can take place in us".2 Time is of course a priori in Kant too in the sense that 
it precedes !simultaneity or succession",3 but it does not refer at all to things in 
themselves; !time is therefore merely a subjective condition of our (human) intuition 
[...], and in itself, outside the subject, is nothing";4 !it does not adhere to the objects 
themselves, rather merely to the subject that intuits them",5 it refers !to objects only so 
far as they are considered as appearances, but do not present things in themselves".6 
Time cannot be determinant in Kant with respect to the order of beings or of Being, 
because it has no access to the things in themselves, it is only the principle which orders 
the world of phenomena by the human ability of cognition. In this sense, of course, a 
priori # as Kant understood it # is independent of experience, precedes it, and makes it 
possible. Nevertheless, one could claim from Heidegger's perspective: Kant overlooked 
the fact that categories understoood in terms of concepts of pure understanding, or the 
concept of the condition of possibility itself, tacitly presuppose a time determination # a 
determination not to be accounted for on the basis of his (subjective a priori) time 
conception. According to Kant experience is made possible by time, but experience 
gives access only to the world of phenomena. Kant must therefore have latently 
presupposed and used another !time"-concept as well, not only that which he expounded 
on in his transcendental aesthetics. Heidegger's objection in fact refers to the Kantian 
distinction between sensibility and understanding as the two stems of cognition # stems 
that !may perhaps arise from a common but to us unknown root".7 Kant, as Heidegger 
formulated, had !a focus on the not original essence of time", and because of this !Kant 
has to contest the temporal character of the <principle of contradiction".8 
                                                 
1 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, transl. Paul Guyer, Allen W. Wood (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1998)  B46#47. 
2 Ibid., B49. 
3 Ibid., B46: !Zugleichsein oder Aufeinanderfolgen". 
4 Ibid., B51. 
5 Ibid., B54. 
6 Ibid., B56. 
7 !...daß es zwei Stämme der menschlichen Erkenntnis gebe, die vielleicht aus einer gemein-
schaftlichen, aber uns unbekannten Wurzel entspringen, nämlich Sinnlichkeit und Verstand" 
(B29). Heidegger criticized this and tried to go beyond it in his book on Kant; see GA 3, 187. 
8 Heidegger GA 3, 195. See Critique of Pure Reason, A152=B192: !the principle of 
contradiction, as a merely logical principle must not limit its claims to temporal relations". 
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 All these considerations are related to the above mentioned possible objection 
claiming: !it precedes it (of course, not in time, but) <logically'". Kant # as has been 
outlined above # might have had no difficulty to agree with this thesis, for on his view 
!all our cognition begins with experience", and !as far as time is concerned, [der Zeit 
nach] then, no cognition in us precedes [geht ... vorher] experience", yet !it does not on 
that account all arise from experience"1 (that is, we could add, originates !logically") # 
for experience is made possible only by time. It is worth noting that Kant tacitly relied  
on two time concepts: a subordinate concept and one which goes beyond this and is 
more general; however, what he explicitly investigated and accounted for was merely 
the first concept. The entire apparatus of pure reason discussed by him in his main work, 
so far as it precedes (and makes possible) experience (and cognition through experience) 
# and is thereby non-experiential or independent from experience (a priori) # from 
Heidegger's point of view contains at the same time a temporal definition. Nevertheless 
Kant discussed time explicitly as only one element or part of this apparatus. He called a 
priori cognitions !those that occur absolutely independently of all experience",2 and by 
this he connected the concept of a priori to the subject. 
 These few short remarks may be sufficient to demonstrate that the opposition or 
separation of time and logic is untenable for Heidegger. According to him, !temporally 
precedes" and !logically precedes" are not two different, separable issues: the latter is in 
fact a particular, derivate case of the former.3 !If the \subject\ gets conceived 
ontologically as an existing Dasein whose Being is grounded in temporality" # we read 
in Being and Time # !then one must say that the world is \subjective\. But in that case, 
this \subjective\ world, as one that is temporally transcendent, is \more objective\ than 
any possible \object\." # The denomination !<more objective' than any possible object" 
by which the world rooted in the temporality of the Dasein, and thus in fact time is 
characterized # as a basically first condition of possibility, as the condition of possibility 
to the appearance of the being inside the world #, makes obvious the interpretation that 
it refers to an absolute first !a priori".4 
                                                 
1 Critique of Pure Reason, B1. 
2 Ibid., B3. 
3 Aristotle differentiated several meanings of !earlier" (!earlier" in space, time, according to 
motion, according to ability, according to order, according to cognition, in the latter case for 
understanding for example the general and the part, for sensory perception the particular and the 
whole are earlier, etc.; see Met., 1018b9#1019a14, De Cat., chapter 12, a14#a35, Anal. post. I, 2, 
71b33#72a5), but for us these meanings are not relevant. From this list of meanings only a few 
have become important for posterity [see H. Schepers, !A priori / a posteriori", Historisches 
Wörterbuch der Philosophie, hg. Joachim Ritter, 1st volume (Basel: Schwabe und Co., 1971), 462 
and the following column]. Heidegger, who on account of his scholastic educational background 
was familiar with Aristotle, obviously was mostly aware of this. The lecture of 1925 within a 
brief survey on the history of the concept refers to the fact that this history reaches back to Plato; 
a year before Heidegger mentioned that Aristotle had used !earlier" not only in a temporal sense, 
but also as an object. Hence Heidegger must have been in sympathy with Husserl's efforts to 
break with the Modern Age tradition which connected the a priori one-sidedly to cognition, to 
subjectivity (see GA 20, 99 ff., and note 3 on page 13#14, as well as GA 18, 3.)   
4 BT 418 (= SZ 69.§., 366: !Zu fragen ist: was ermöglicht es ontologisch, daß Seiendes inner-
weltlich begegnen und als begegnendes objektiviert werden kannX Der Rückgang auf die eksta-
tisch-horizontal fundierte Transzendenz der Welt gibt die Antwort. # Wenn das »Subjekt« 
ontologisch als existierendes Dasein begriffen wird, dessen Sein in der Zeitlichkeit gründet, dann 
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 One of the fundamental insights made by Heidegger on his path towards Being 
and Time might be summed up as follows: Being has been interpreted in the 
philosophical tradition with regard to such concepts as !presence", !eternal being", etc. 
Worthy of attention is thereby that Being is latently given temporal determinations, and 
that time functions at the same time as an index for delimiting the different spheres of 
beings (temporal, timeless, and trans-temporal beings1). The philosophical tradition has 
                                                                                                                                    
muß gesagt werden: Welt ist »subjektiv«. Diese »subjektive« Welt aber ist dann als zeitlich-
transzendente »objektiver« als jedes mögliche »Objekt«.") 
1 Cf. SZ 18 (= LI 109#110). It is worth quoting Heidegger's argumentation in the original 
language and in somewhat more detail: !Die »Zeit« fungiert seit langem als ontologisches oder 
vielmehr ontisches Kriterium der naiven Unterscheidung der verschiedenen Regionen des 
Seienden. Man grenzt ein »zeitlich« Seiendes (die Vorgänge der Natur und die Geschehnisse der 
Geschichte) ab gegen »unzeitlich« Seiendes (die räumlichen und zahlhaften Verhältnisse). Man 
pflegt »zeitlosen« Sinn von Sätzen abzuheben gegen »zeitlichen« Ablauf der Satzaussagen. 
Ferner findet man eine »Kluft« zwischen dem »zeitlich« Seienden und dem »überzeitlichen« 
Ewigen und versucht sich an deren Überbrückung. »Zeitlich« besagt hier jeweils soviel wie »in 
der Zeit« seiend, eine Bestimmung, die freilich auch noch dunkel genug ist. Das Faktum besteht: 
Zeit, im Sinne von »in der Zeit sein«, fungiert als Kriterium der Scheidung von Seinsregionen. 
Wie die Zeit zu dieser ausgezeichneten ontologischen Funktion kommt und gar mit welchem 
Recht gerade so etwas wie Zeit als solches Kriterium fungiert und vollends, ob in dieser naiv 
ontologischen Verwendung der Zeit ihre eigentliche mögliche ontologische Relevanz zum 
Ausdruck kommt, ist bislang weder gefragt, noch untersucht worden." (Emphasis is mine I. F. 
M.) It will not be useless to quote from the second next paragraph as well, because it not only 
completes the former considerations, but at the same time it points out the central difficulty 
around which Heidegger's intellectual efforts revolved for decades: !Wenn Sein aus der Zeit 
begriffen werden soll und die verschiedenen Modi und Derivate von Sein in ihren 
Modifikationen und Derivationen in der Tat aus dem Hinblick auf Zeit verständlich werden, dann 
ist damit das Sein selbst # nicht etwa nur Seiendes als »in der Zeit« Seiendes, in seinem 
»zeitlichen« Charakter sichtbar gemacht. »Zeitlich« kann aber dann nicht mehr nur besagen »in 
der Zeit seiend«. Auch das »Unzeitliche« und »Überzeitliche« ist hinsichtlich seines Seins 
»zeitlich«. Und das wiederum nicht nur in der Weise einer Privation gegen ein »Zeitliches« als 
»in der Zeit« Seiendes, sondern in einem positiven, allerdings erst zu klärenden Sinne. Weil der 
Ausdruck »zeitlich« durch den vorphilosophischen und philosophischen Sprachgebrauch in der 
angeführten Bedeutung belegt ist und weil der Ausdruck in den folgenden Untersuchungen noch 
für eine andere Bedeutung in Anspruch genommen wird, nennen wir die ursprüngliche Sinnbe-
stimmtheit des Seins und seiner Charaktere und Modi aus der Zeit seine temporale Bestimmtheit. 
Die fundamentale ontologische Aufgabe der Interpretation von Sein als solchem begreift daher in 
sich die Herausarbeitung der Temporalität des Seins. In der Exposition der Problematik der 
Temporalität ist allererst die konkrete Antwort auf die Frage nach dem Sinn des Seins gegeben." 
(Ibid., 18 ff.; the first and the third emphases are mine, I. F. M.) The expression !temporal", said 
Heidegger # and this is a key sentence from the point of view of this analysis # did not mean to 
him !in the time"; this expression was used in a different meaning later on. The non-
consideration of this fact led to Heidegger being criticised on several occasions for not having 
offered a !correct" interpretation or reconstruction of the philosophical tradition's time 
conceptions # from Aristotle to Kant and Bergson # in his philosophy historical interpretations 
referring to this issue. For a mostly similar discussion of the problem see GA 20, 7 ff., especially 
the question at the end of the considerations: !Was gibt überhaupt der Zeit und dem Begriff der 
Zeit [...], die Eignung zu dieser eigentümlichen, bisher immer als selbstverständlich 
aufgenommenen Funktion bei der charakteristik und scheidung der wirklichkeitsgebiete # 
zeitliche, außerzeitliche, überzeitliche wirklichkeitX" (Ibid., 8.) # In what follows I shall use some 
Philobiblon Vol XV (2010) 
 23
connected Being and time from its very beginnings, defining Being # without becoming 
aware of this # temporally. That Being was interpreted on a temporal basis has remained 
hidden, and thus the question has not been raised concerning the way time can fulfil 
such a basic ontological function, and what the condition of possibility of this function 
is. !On the contrary, they take time itself as one entity among other entities, and try to 
grasp it in the structure of its Being, though that way of understanding Being, which 
they have taken as their horizon is one which is itself naïvely and inexplicitly oriented 
towards time."1 We could formulate # with some simplification # the dilemma in the 
following way. The fact that we define being latently by means of time directs our 
attention to the concept of time. But we must realize that no inherited concept of time 
can provide a starting point for a concept of time related to Being (able to define Being); 
that is, a new, a more thorough time concept is necessary. Being is defined through time, 
but time itself is also conceived as one being among several others. Time thus defined 
consequently already contains Being, thus it is not able, vice versa, to define the latter 
on a second level. (That by which Being is defined already contains Being, thus it 
proves to be unsuitable to perform precisely the very task it is resorted to for: to define 
Being.) Some levelled concept of Being and some similarly levelled time concept are 
here closely connected and almost inseparably interwoven: Being is grasped through the 
horizon of a levelled time; time through the horizon of a levelled Being.2 # A 
retrospective summarization from 1969, which was made accessible for the wider public 
only lately, in 2007, in the 14th volume of the complete works, confirms what has been 
said: !The traditional notion of time proved to be inadequate for the attempt to discuss 
the relation of Being and time. My question about time was determined from the 
perspective of the question of Being."3 
 It is not among beings only, as some kind of a highest or foremost entity, that 
Being is an absolute a priori, that is, the first, !earliest", but it completely differs from  
beings: it is an absolute a priori compared to every entity, it precedes every being as 
being. Time itself on its turn # as something which precedes every earlier and later, and 
is able to define Being, this absolute a priori, to which it is able to confer the character 
of !earliest" # must, for this very reason, have an absolute a priori character as well. 
Being and time are co-originally a priori in the same measure. Being becomes the 
earliest by means of time, through time. In other words: without time Being could not be 
the absolute first, the absolute a priori; Being # conceived as !earliest", as absolute first 
# is given by time; time, which, so to say, !arrives" (!comes" in the sense outlined 
above in part III) together with Being: it cannot be before Being, for, without Being, as 
?beingless" as it were, it would be nothing, on the other hand, it cannot have !its own 
                                                                                                                                    
summarizing remarks from my earlier book on Heidegger: István M. Fehér, Martin Heidegger.  
Egy XX. századi gondolkodó életútja (Martin Heidegger. The Path of a 20th Century Thinker), 
2nd, extended edition (Budapest: Göncöl, 1992), 69. 
1 BT 48. (= SZ 26: !Diese griechische Seinsauslegung vollzieht sich jedoch ohne jedes ausdrück-
liche Wissen um den dabei fungierenden Leitfaden, ohne Kenntnis oder gar Verständnis der 
fundamentalen ontologischen Funktion der Zeit, ohne Einblick in den Grund der Möglichkeit 
dieser Funktion. Im Gegenteil: die Zeit selbst wird als ein Seiendes unter anderem Seienden 
genommen, und es wird versucht, sie selbst aus dem Horizont des an ihr unausdrücklich-naiv 
orientierten Seinsverständnisses in ihrer Seinsstruktur zu fassen.") 
2 See to this the retrospective remark of the old Heidegger quoted in note 1 on page 15. 
3 See GA 14, 148. 
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existence" separate from Being, for then it would be one entity among many others, and 
its character as a !conferrer of Being" would be lost, for it would already possess # 
nobody knows from where, but in any case # Being from somewhere. Time and Being 




V. 1. Objections against Heidegger's time conception, time conceived as the a priori of 
a priori, can be formulated only from the horizon of a non-Heideggerian time 
conception, called by Heidegger vulgar, as we have said above. This observation leads 
to a difficulty regarding the whole of Heidegger's thought # and maybe even philosophy 
itself. The characteristic feature of the answer given to this objection (its strength, and 
from another point of view also its weakness) is that it can be put forward as a universal 
defence, which can be resorted to at any time; a trump which can be played always, 
against any objection. This is a defence strategy which thus raises suspicion, for it can 
avert or immunize any objection. If a philosopher uses a notion in a new, unusual sense 
(as it happens in our case with the concept of time), then any objection referring to some 
traditional # usual, long standing # sense of the notion in question can far too easily be 
repelled with the observation: !I use the concept in another sense". Thus one can evade 
any comparison and criticism. On the other hand, it is also most probably true that if we 
contested the philosophers' right to use traditional expressions in a new, unusual sense, 
then we would question their freedom and the freedom of philosophy as well; by this we 
would eventually put an end to philosophy. To formulate new, so far unobserved or 
unheard-of questions, problems, one needs a new language, or the old one must be 
modified to a certain extent. If we wanted to deny this right of philosophers, we would 
do irreparable harm to philosophy itself.  
 This dilemma can hardly be solved or answered in general; it must be studied 
case by case whether the new, uncommon use of concepts has any # first of all objective 
# base, or simply # for example # eccentricity and/or the wish to evade comparison and 
criticism operates in the background. In other words, it must be investigated case by 
case whether the new, uncommon use of concepts outlines a new message, with an 
interesting object # and the uncommon use of concepts is an organic vehicle for 
conveying this message #, or it is merely eccentricity, pointless self-differentiation from 
one's predecessors, exhibitionism, whereby the uncommon use of concepts refers only 
back to itself, without creating a consistent, new, interesting world. 
 This dilemma cannot have been unknown to Heidegger # the philosopher, who 
had been using concepts in a new, uncommon sense, from the moment he had stepped 
into the limelight, found himself in the critical crossfire of a philosophy based on 
traditional use of words (and thus: on a traditional view of the world), being exposed to 
perpetual attacks #, and he himself kept hesitating for a long time with respect to the 
adequate procedure. There was a case when he could have considered the above 
mentioned suspicion worthy of notice, and when we might perceive his reaction as a 
withdrawal; this was when, at the end of his philosophic path, he gave up or retracted, 
accompanied by a sever self-criticism, his interpretation concerning truth as aletheia 
conceived in terms of unconcealment # one of the central theses of his entire life work #; 
more exactly, when he gave up the connection between his interpretation regarding the 
aletheia and the traditional idea of truth. In fact and more particularly, he  did continue 
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to uphold the interpretation of aletheia as unconcealment and Lichtung, what he 
renounced was only the thesis that this very interpretation # the interpretation of 
aletheia, unconcealment and Lichtung # should be taken to be at the same time as an 
interpretation of truth as well (which is what, in any case, he had definitely stated 
before). The question concerning aletheia as unconcealment, he claimed in the 1960s, 
should not be understood as identical with the question concerning truth. Thereby, 
however, the thesis stating the change of the essence of truth # that is, its change from 
unconcealment into correctness (a thesis pointedly supported by Heidegger himself in 
the course of his philosophic career up to that point, and which represented an important 
part of his philosophical path) # became !untenable", sounded the words of his sever 
self-critique.1 
 This self-criticism, however, is perplexing; in any case it requires further 
interpretation. If we can rely on mere words, in my opinion, this gesture was as 
overhasty as his retrospective annihilating # most probably exaggerated # self-critical 
remarks on his Kant interpretation in the preface to the fourth edition of his book on 
Kant.2 
 To interpret this exaggerated self-criticism is not at all an easy task, and it has 
given rise to wide ranging and widely spread debates and discussions in the literature, 
which will be worth being discussed here briefly. !There is no need to dwell on the 
surprise", wrote for example Vincenzo Vitiello, !which the reading of this text could 
rise in a reader somewhat familiar with Heidegger's work. It seems, Heidegger has 
                                                 
1 !Das Ende der Philosophie und die Aufgabe des Denkens", see Heidegger, Zur Sache des 
Denkens, 77 ff. = GA 14, 86 ff. It is worth quoting some parts of the text referring to this issue, 
the study entitled Das Ende der Philosophie und die Aufgabe des Denkens, which was first 
published in French in 1964, then in German in 1969: Heidegger, Zur Sache Des Denkens, 2., 
unveränderte Auflage,  [1. Auflage 1969] (Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1976), 61#80, here 76#78; see 
now GA 14, 69#90, here 85#87: !Sofern man Wahrheit im überlieferten »natürlichen« Sinn [...] 
versteht, [...] darf die Aletheia, die Unverborgenheit im Sinne der Lichtung, nicht mit der 
Wahrheit gleichgesetzt werden. Viel mehr gewährt die Aletheia, die Unverborgenheit als 
Lichtung gedacht, erst die Möglichkeit von Wahrheit. [...] Aletheia, Unverborgenheit als 
Lichtung von Anwesenheit gedacht, ist noch nicht Wahrheit. Ist die Aletheia dann weniger als 
WahrheitX Oder ist sie mehr [...]X [...] In jedem Fall wird das eine klar: Die Frage nach der 
Aletheia, nach der Unverborgenheit als solcher, ist nicht die Frage nach der Wahrheit. Darum 
war es nicht sachgemäß und dem zufolge irreführend, die Aletheia im Sinne der Lichtung 
Wahrheit zu nennen. [...] Der natürliche Begriff von Wahrheit meint nicht Unverborgenheit, auch 
nicht in der Philosophie der Griechen. [...] Im Gesichtskreis dieser Frage muß anerkannt werden, 
daß die Aletheia, die Unverborgenheit im Sinne der Lichtung von Anwesenheit sogleich und nur 
als orthotes, als die Richtigkeit des Vorstellens und Aussagens erfahren wurde. Dann ist aber 
auch die Behauptung von einem Wesenswandel der Wahrheit, d.h. von der Unverborgenheit zur 
Richtigkeit, nicht haltbar." (Emphases are mine I. F. M.). The italicized parts contain the steps of 
the supposed retractatio, which, for the sake of perspicuity, can be summarized with some 
paraphrasing in the following theses: 1. The question referring to aletheia, to disclosedness is not 
identical with the question referring to truth (though Heidegger had so far stated so). 2. Because 
of this it was not justified to call the aletheia truth taken in the sense of Lichtung (though 
Heidegger had so far done so). 3. The natural idea of truth does not mean disclosedness, it did not 
mean this even in Greek philosophy (though Heidegger had so far stated so). 4. Thus the 
statement referring to the change of the essence of truth (as it was said in the Platons Lehre von 
der Wahrheit) is untenable. 
2 See GA 3, ^IV. 
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indeed given up the thesis formulated in Platons Lehre von der Wahrheit and earlier in 
Sein und Zeit. If it were so, the self-criticism would be excessively radical, for it would 
not refer to some secondary aspect of Heidegger's thought, but to the main line of his 
interpretation of Greek philosophy, which is present in his thinking from the beginning 
to the end, and which constitutes one of its basic components."1 In a note Vitellio added: 
!It seems that Heidegger adopts Friedländer's criticism directed to him (Platon I, Berlin 
1954, Teil II, ^I, Aletheia. Eine Auseinandersetzung mit M. Heidegger, especially pp. 
233#237.) Nevertheless, this is opposed to the fact that in his writing entitled Hegel und 
die Griechen [...] Heidegger explicitly refused this criticism." The esssay Hegel und die 
Griechen is earlier in time than the other writing [entitled Das Ende der Philosophie und 
die Aufgabe des Denkens] (it was written in 1958, while the latter at the beginning of the 
1960s), thus one might think that Heidegger changed his opinion in the course of these 
few years. However, this is contradicted by the fact that he published the writing of 
1958 in his study collection entitled Wegmarken (its first edition appeared in 1967) not 
only without changing anything in his critique referring to Friedländer (see first edition 
1967, p. 271), but also without making any reference to his latter work published for the 
first time in French in 1964, which would be extremely strange, if the hypothesis 
referring to his self-criticism were correct. By contrast, Vitello said, the self-criticism 
occurred on Friedländer's side (see Platon I, 3rd edition, 1964, p. 242). Be how it may, 
!the radicality of his self-criticism is perplexing. In two short paragraphs Heidegger 
would have retracted one of the basic pillars of his interpretation referring to 
metaphysics as the history of Being. The thing (Sache) itself would probably have 
deserved a more thorough and articulated discussion."2 # In what follows, on the basis 
of a circumspect argumentation Vitiello arrived at the conclusion that Heidegger had not 
repudiate the thesis in question, but rather shifted the emphasis: according to the new 
conception, in Platon truth conceived as correctness (the correctness of the gaze) # an 
aspect already present in Pre-Socratic philosophy, which does not substitute, but much 
rather # thrusts into the background or overshadows the concept of truth perceived as 
unconcealment.3 In other words, the decline of aletheia according to the modified 
conception is not to be dated to Plato's age, rather, it had begun already with 
Parmenides. 
 Heidegger disciple Walter Bröcker also expressed his surprise in his review 
written on Heidegger's volume in question. !That Heidegger buried the favourite child 
of his later years, the Lichtung", he wrote, !is most probably a sensational news", but, 
according to Bröcker, this is only !news about the last turn of a man, who, as a good 
alpinist has already left behind several turns".4 
                                                 
1 Vincenzo Vitiello, Dialettica ed ermeneutica: Hegel e Heidegger (Napoli: Guida, 1979), 151 ff. 
2 Ibid., 153. 
3 Ibid., 160. 
4 See Walter Bröcker, !Heideggers letztes Wort über Parmenides", Philosophische Rundschau 
29, no. 1#2 (1982), 72#76, here 76: !Daß Heideggers Parmenides nicht der wirkliche Parmenides 
war, sondern eine von ersterem  erschaffene Kunstfigur, und daß Burnet vom wirklichen 
Parmenides 1892 mehr wußte als Heidegger 1973, das ist wohl keine neue Nachricht. Daß aber 
der alte Heidegger durch sein erneutes Sichzukehren zu seiner Kunstfigur das Lieblingkind seiner 
späten Jahre, die Lichtung, umgebracht hat, das ist, wenn anders die protokollierenden Franzosen 
Unverbergendes gesagt haben, wirklich eine  neue Nachricht, die  Nachricht von der letzten 
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If we read Heidegger's text attentively # the philological authenticity of this 
text, let us add, cannot be regarded as completely secured #, we may note however that 
                                                                                                                                    
Kehre eines  Mannes, der auch schon vorher, als ein guter Bergsteiger, mehr als eine Kehre hinter 
sich gebracht hatte". 
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not the concept of Lichtung is questioned in it, but the fact is emphasized that 
unconcealment in the sense of Lichtung should be separated from the (traditional) idea 
of truth.1 Heidegger could have wished to cut from the interrelated concepts of aletheia, 
Lichtung, Unverborgenheit the reference to the later meaning of truth as adequatio (and 
thus to loosen or detach Lichtung from truth), because he might have seen this 
identification to cause a disturbing contamination, and to be an obstacle in the original 
understanding of Lichtung. In other words: for the original understanding of Lichtung 
we do not need to draw the (traditional, later) concept of truth into the interpretation, 
this could only disturb the picture. But we could also formulate things in this way: 
having traced back truth to its original meaning, having understood it in these terms, we 
have no need to refer (back) the original idea of truth to the secondary, derivate truth 
concept, indeed, we had better leave it completely out of consideration. The text 
otherwise mentions truth # as something which does not have the same meaning as 
aletheia # each time in its traditional, !natural" (that is, not specifically Heideggerian) 
meaning.2 Heidegger had indeed made great efforts earlier (e.g., in his main work) to 
derive this truth concept from the original idea of truth, at this late stage of his path, 
however, it might have seemed more important to him to outline the original concept of 
truth, more precisely the concept of aletheia (as Unverborgenheit, Lichtung) in an 
indepen dent way, than to derive the traditional (epistemological) idea of truth from it, 
or than to connect it or relate it to the latter. This relation, he could have believed, only 
makes the precise understanding of the Lichtung-concept more difficult, therefore it is 
better to ignore it. But teh remark may be in order: the connection is not entirely 
annihilated by this text either, as a reference shows. The emphasis in any case fell on the 
fact # and this was a real changed as compared to Platons Lehre von der Wahrheit # that 
the decline of the aletheia had not began with Plato, but already with Pre-Socratic 
philosophy, namely with Parmenides. 
 Robert Bernasconi arrived at basically the same conclusion. He investigated 
these texts in relation to the Heidegger#Friedländer debate, and besides pointing out 
some less significant cases of shift in accent, he did not observe any kind of withdrawal, 
retracting in Heidegger, much rather # on the contrary # consequent thinking. !But the 
retraction", he wrote, !does not amount to a denial that in Plato aletheia as 
unconcealment # and thus also orthotes as correctness # comes under the yoke of the 
idea. Once this is recognized, it becomes apparent that Heidegger's so-called retraction 
amounts to a strengthening and clarifying his major claim concerning the concealment 
of concealing, not a weakening of it."3 In other words, Heidegger # in opposition to 
Bröcker's statement # rather than bury his interpretation concerning Lichtung, on the 
contrary, he did very much strengthen it by dating back the turn in the decline of the 
aletheia from Plato's time to Parmenides' age. 
 Bernasconi's observation lends itself to the following interpretation. His 
statement referring to the consistency in Heidegger's thinking # and the strengthening of 
                                                 
1 Cf. Zur Sache des Denkens, 78 = GA 14, 87. 
2 Cf. Zur Sache des Denkens, 76 ff. = GA 14, 85 ff. !Sofern man Wahrheit im überlieferten 
»natürlichen« Sinn als die am Seienden ausgewiesene Übereinstimmung der Erkenntnis mit dem 
Seienden versteht [...]"; !Der natürliche Begriff von Wahrheit meint nicht Unverborgenheit, auch 
nicht in der Philosophie der Griechen." 
3 Robert Bernasconi, The Question of Language in Heidegger"s History of Being, (Atlantic 
Highlands, N. J.: Humanities, 1985), 20 ff., see page 22. 
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the Lichtung-interpretation # holds true, if the case is not such # as one could believe on 
the basis of the Plato-study # that concealment was originally obvious, self-revealing, 
and it began to conceal itself only later, in Plato. The statement is therefore true in the 
contrary case, namely, if concealment is seen as being characterized # according to the 
attentive and consistent consideration # exactly by the fact that it had concealed itself 
already at the very beginning, and not at some later time. The hiddenness of 
concealment belongs to the # original # essence of concealment precisely  to the extent 
to which for example forgetting characterized by the fact that it does not only forget 
something, but it also forgets forgetting itself.1 If, according to Heidegger's former 
Plato-interpretation, the meaning of (aletheia as) unconcealment underwent a decisive 
change in Plato by the fact that the aletheia became subject to the yoke of the idea (and 
by this it shifted into the correctness of the gaze), then this suggests (though Heidegger 
did not mention it), that Pre-Socratic Greek philosophy could still have experienced 
aletheia as unconcealment, it could have experienced that it explicitly revealed itself. 
Now, it is this latter tacit assumption that has been retracted or refuted # or maybe only 
detailed, specified # by Heidegger, when he says that not even Pre-Platonic Greek 
thinking did conceive aletheia specifically # it named it, but it did not conceive it. 
(Vitiello reversed the emphasis saying: !Lichtung, though it remained unconceived, was 
named".2) 
 An observation made by Heidegger during a Heraclitus seminar held together 
with Eugen Fink in 1966#1967 confirms and at the same time completes the 
considerations of the study Das Ende der Philosophie... Aletheia as aletheia, said 
Heidegger, has nothing to do with truth # it means only unconcealment. What had been 
said in the main work (see Sein und Zeit, p. 219) already pointed to this direction. !I 
have always been preoccupied with aletheia as unconcealment, but <truth' has slipped 
in" (!schob sich dazwischen"),3 he added meaningfully. To this we might perhaps add 
that it slipped in necessarily, for without it Heidegger would never have arrived to the 
interpretation of aletheia as unconcealment. It was a ladder by all means necessary for 
climbing, but # once we had climbed up # it could be thrown away. The important thing 
# from the perspective of the late Heidegger who gave precedence to Sein over Dasein # 
was in any case aletheia, unconcealment, Lichtung. Dasein is not emphatically present 
in either of these; while, on the contrary, it is very much present !in the truth" 
understood n terms of the correctness of the gaze. Thus the late Heidegger could light-
heartedly get rid !of truth"; and he could refer to it in this respect only according to its 
current, superficial, !traditional <natural'" sense. For he had already included its genuine 
sense in aletheia # in unconcealment, in Lichtung #, thus he could leave it behind or get 
rid of it. 
  A concise observation in the study Hegel und die Griechen expresses the core 
of the matter well: !(If the soon dominant essence of truth as correctness and certainty 
can only exist in the realm of unconcealment, then) truth has everything to do with 
                                                 
1 Cf. GA 24, 411: !It is inherent to the essence [...] of forgetfulness that it does not only forget the 
forgotten, but it also forgets forgetfulness itself" (see also GA 51, 65, GA 54, 120; cf. Fehér, 
Martin Heidegger..., 224, 275.) 
2 Vitiello, Dialettica ed ermeneutica..., 154. 
3 Martin Heidegger#Eugen Fink, Heraklit. Seminar Wintersemester 1966/1967 (Frankfurt/Main: 
Klostermann, 1970), 260; see now GA 15, 262.  
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aletheia, but not this with truth."1 It is a relationship between the original and the 
derivative. The original can stand independently, without the derivative, but the latter 
cannot exist without the former.2 According to Being and Time, the basis of a 
proposition's truth as correctness, as correspondence is conferred by the truth of the 
being as unconcealment # this standpoint was to be preserved by Heidegger later. If he 
withdrew the reference of aletheia to truth in his later years, his reason for doing so 
could have been that truth appeared to him only in this secondary # we could say: 
declined # sense (preliminary understanding); that is, in the sense of the proposition's 
truth, of correspondence between statement and thing. !Truth" could have become 
limited to this dimension of meaning; the other layers of meaning which had played a 
crucial role in the discussion of truth in his early career and which opened for him the 
ontological dimension of truth (e.g. !we live and die for truth", theoretical truth versus 
historical, religious truth3) could have receded into the background # or they were even 
transposed into aletheia (as Lichtung), and thus they were included, preserved in it.4 
 In the very first sentence of the fairly long § 44 (pp. 212#230) in Being and 
Time, which discusses truth, Heidegger drew attention to the fact that !the Greeks had 
connected truth with Being since ancient times", then after quoting and commenting 
briefly the Aristotelian passages referring to the question, he argued that the concept of 
truth is basically an ontological problem, though the later epistemological truth concept 
(according to which truth is in fact correspondence between statement and object) may 
also be justified. From this perspective one may say: for Heidegger # mainly in his later 
philosophy #, this connection of Being and truth # the truth of Being, as he expressed it 
# must have been much more essential than the truth of linguistic statements, of human 
                                                 
1 GA 9, 442. (= Wegmarken, single edition, 270.) Both the italics and the parentheses in the 
quotation are mine. I want to suggest by this that the text can be understood without the 
parentheses, moreover, from the point of view of this analysis the italicized part receives the 
emphasis; the half sentence placed in parenthesis contains additional information, therefore it 
would not have been right to omit it entirely.   
2 See Zur Sache des Denkens, 76 ff. = GA 14, 86: !Aletheia, Unverborgenheit als Lichtung von 
Anwesenheit gedacht, ist noch nicht Wahrheit. Ist die Aletheia dann weniger als WahrheitX Oder 
ist sie mehr, weil sie Wahrheit als adaequatio und certitudo erst gewährt, weil es Anwesenheit 
und Gegenwärtigung außerhalb des Bereiches der Lichtung nicht geben kannX" 
3 GA 45, 28; GA 17, 98. # For a more detailed analysis see István M. Fehér, Heidegger és a 
szkepticizmus. A szkeptikus kételyen át a hermeneutikai kérdésig (Heidegger and Scepticism. 
Through Sceptical Doubt to the Hermeneutical Question) (Budapest: Korona Nova, 1998), 51#
64, especially 60 ff. 
4 A similar shift could have taken place in Heidegger's thinking related to theology: after he had 
relocated his religious concerns # together with his original interest in actual life experience # 
definitively into (Greek) philosophy until the mid 1920s, he regarded Christianity only as a 
superficial, rigid theology, estranged from life, which contained and passed on a petrified and 
deformed Greek philosophy, and ?theology" only occurred in his texts in a negative sense. The 
Heideggerian !Denken" at the same time, while completely undermining the conceptual basis of 
traditional theology, with its quietly questioning character became in its way filled with 
theological-religious features. See this question in more detail in: István M. Fehér, !Karl Rahner 
szellemi gyökereihez: Heidegger és a ^^. századi teológia" (To Karl Rahner's Intellectual 
Origin: Heidegger and the 20th Century Philosophy), in Az Ige meghallója. Karl Rahner 
emlékülés (The Hearer of the Word. Karl Rahner Memorial Session), ed. István Boros (Szeged # 
Budapest: Szegedi Hittudományi FĘiskola # Logos Kiadó, 1996), 43#91, here 80 (note no. 40), 
87 ff. (note no. 66).    
Philobiblon Vol XV (2010) 
 31
cognition considered in a wider sense # as adequacy #; thus he could even give up 
(light-heartedly, anyway seeing the repeated misunderstandings) its reference to the 
latter (in favour of the former). 
 Let us summarize: Heidegger's different interpretations given about the concept 
of truth in the course of several decades are a famous case when he used concepts in a 
new, unusual sense. That which he revealed, or thought to reveal in the course of these 
interpretations is highly debatable and debated, but his analyses in any case outlined 
new, interesting thoughts. What has proved to be disturbing on several occasions in the 
course of decades was that Heidegger connected these thoughts to the concept of truth, 
made them known under the designation of the concept of truth. This has been 
disturbing because there is nonetheless a considerable distance between the usual, well-
established, traditional sense of truth and the Heideggerian usage (!unconcealment"). 
The question may be raised: why did Heidegger resort to the concept of truth to convey 
his thoughtX And was he right to do soX Is the fact that in Greek the literal meaning of 
!truth" is !unconcealment" a sufficient justificationX As we have seen, Heidegger in the 
end decided to keep the interpretation in question # its objective grounding, weight, 
importance #, but he renounced the word, which means that he no longer referred the 
interpretation to !truth", he did not keep it as the interpretation of truth. (The truth of 
Being is the unconcealment of Being, one could summarize the former thesis; while the 
latter could be summed up approximately as follows: in the statement concerning the 
unconcealment of Being unconcealment does not have the same meaning as truth; 
nevertheless, Being is in any case characterized by unconcealment, that is, the 
unconcealment of Being # which conceals itself # is an essential and important 
phenomenon in itself, its reference to truth is untenable, but it is unimportant.) This, of 
course, implies other difficulties, for the phenomenon is thus so much as pushed into the 
unnameable; by this we refer to the particular difficulty we have already mentioned 
briefly above,1 which accompanied Heidegger all the way through his path as a thinker # 
and which maybe characterizes philosophy in general #, namely, the scarcity of 
language. 
 
V. 2. It will be of use to mention in brief some similar cases, in which Heidegger's key 
concepts appear in a new, unusual sense, different from the traditional. !If Heidegger 
speaks [...] about the <history' of Being," wrote in his basic monograph Otto Pöggeler, 
!than that which is called [...] here history must strictly be differentiated from that which 
we call history otherwise, namely from that area of being which, for example, is usually 
opposed to nature. What nature and history are in their own being can be adequately 
conceived only from the direction of the experience regarding the truth of being."2 The 
Heidegger texts published after Pöggeler's monograph confirm this interpretation. 
Indeed, Heidegger in his second period wrote: !We do not understand here history as 
one of the realms of  being, but exclusively with respect to the essence of Being. [...] By 
this, however, we do not push for example <nature' into the background, but this also 
goes through a similarly original transformation. In this original concept of history we 
arrive for the first time to the realm where it becomes perceivable, history is <more' than 
                                                 
1 See above note 3 on page 19. 
2 Otto Pöggeler, Der Denkweg Martin Heideggers (Pfullingen: Neske, 1963), 2nd, extended 
edition, 1983, 186. 
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action and will". The aim of the considerations in question, wrote Heidegger, is neither 
!some theory of history, nor some philosophy of history".1 In the expression !the history 
of Being", the word history figures in a non-traditional, unusual sense. The 
differentiation !nature"#!history" itself constitutes an age in the !history of Being". 
According to this, the expression !history" means radically different things in the two 
cases (between them the distance is !infinite", in a sense which we are going to expound 
on later), and the question may be put: is the use of the same word justifiedX To what 
extent can the history of Being be described as !history"X 
 I attempted to formulate a similar objection in one of my former studies 
regarding Heidegger's ontological radicalization of the wissenschaftsheoretisch concept 
of understanding; the issue in question is related to nothing less than the ontological turn 
or radicalization of 20th century hermeneutics. I did this on the basis of a critical 
perspective formulated by Heidegger himself in his main work arguing against  
Descartes in the following way: !The question may arise: is there not an infinite 
difference between the (traditional) epistemological and the (new) ontological concept 
of understanding and through this a possibility to span itX To perceive understanding as 
a kind of cognition does not raise too great difficulties; to call understanding a mode of 
being, however, is at least unusual or perplexing. The latter, unusual way of expression, 
nevertheless, would still be acceptable; but the fact that, in spite of his unusual use of the 
concept of understanding, Heidegger attempted to relate his concept of understanding to 
the epistemological concept of understanding he had declared outworn and had left 
behind, the fact that he tried to bridge the gap between the two is worth much more 
consideration. At this point the question may arise: what right had Heidegger to claim 
that his ontological concept of understanding constituted the fundamnet of the 
epistemological concept of understanding, and that the latter was nothing else than the 
derivative of the formerX Is not the difference between the two <infinite'X"2 The 
                                                 
1 GA 65, 32 ff. See ibid. 359, 421; furthermore Der Satz vom Grund, 2nd edition (Pfullingen: 
Neske, 1958), 109, 114, 120, 130. The issue already appeared in the early lectures, e.g. in the 
famous lecture course on the phenomenology of religion; see GA 60, 32. From Pöggeler referring 
to this see also: !Temporale Interpretation und hermeneutische Philosophie", Revue 
Internationale de Philosophie 43 (1989), 5#32, here 30 (reprinted in Pöggeler, Neue Wege mit 
Heidegger,  Freiburg/München: Alber, 1992, 115#141, here 139 ff.);  !Zeit und Hermeneutik", in 
Krisis der Metaphysik. Wolfgang Müller-Lauter zum 65. Geburtstag, hrsg. G. Abel#J. Salaquarde 
(Berlin#New York: De Gruyter, 1989), 364#388, here 380 (reprinted in Pöggeler, Schritte zu 
einer hermeneutischen Philosophie (Freiburg/München: Alber, 1994), 115#141, here 132). 
2 István M. Fehér, !Verstehen bei Heidegger und Gadamer", in $Dimensionen des Hermeneu-
tischen%. Heidegger und Gadamer, hrsg. G. Figal und H.-H. Gander (Schriftenreihe der Martin-
Heidegger-Gesellschaft, Bd. 7) (Frankfurt/Main: Klostermann, 2005), 89#115, here 104: !Es 
kann [...] die Frage entstehen: gibt es nicht einen unendlichen Unterschied, und damit keine 
Brücke zwischen dem (traditionellen) erkenntnistheoretischen und dem (neuen) ontologischen 
VerstehensbegriffX Die Auffassung des Verstehens als eine Art Erkennen bereitet ja keine große 
Schwierigkeiten; Verstehen als Seinsart anzusprechen ist dagegen zumindest ungewöhnlich oder 
befremdend. Dieses, die ungewöhnliche Redeweise könnte gleichwohl noch akzeptabel sein; was 
bedenklicher erscheint, ist, daß Heidegger, seiner ungewöhnlichen Beanspruchung des 
Verstehensbegriffs zum Trotz, den Versuch unternimmt, ihn selbst mit dem für überwunden 
deklarierten und hinter sich gelassenen erkenntnistheoretischen Begriff in Verbindung zu setzen, 
zwischen beiden eine Brücke zu schlagen. An diesem Punkt kann die Frage entstehen: Mit 
welchem Recht behauptet Heidegger, sein ontologischer Verstehensbegriff bilde den Grund des 
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formulation of such a question may be seen as being justified by Heidegger himself, 
who, discussing the Cartesian definition of the world as res extensa, wrote in his main 
work: !Every entity which is not God is an ens creatum. The Being which belongs to 
one of these entities is \infinitely\ different from that which belongs to the other; yet we 
still consider creation and creator alike as entities. We are thus using <Being' in so wide 
a sense that its meaning embraces an \infinite\ difference."1  
 If we adopt this critical point of view, the question arises whether a kind of 
!infinite difference" in a similar sense can or cannot be discovered in the concept of 
understanding in Heidegger himself through the fact that according to his intentions this 
conception was meant to encompass both the traditional epistemological and 
wissenschaftstheoretisch aspects, as well as the new ontological dimension (radicalized 
by Heidegger). The discussed case is similar to the above analyzed dilemma regarding 
the problem of truth in virtue of the fact that there the Heideggerian concept of truth 
(truth as unconcealment) and the traditional one # conceived as the correspondence 
between proposition and object # were to be connected; these two poles are constituted 
in the present case mostly in a similar sense by the ontological and epistemological 
concepts of understanding. This example, however, differs from the former in that while 
in the former case Heidegger ceased at a certain point to refer the two poles to one 
another # and thus, we may say, he tacitly acknowledged the existence of the !infinite 
difference" #, in the case of the concept of understanding such a retraction, as far as I am 
aware, did not occur. It is true, however, that here this would have been most probably 
needless, therefore it could scarcely have been seriously considered, for the late 
Heidegger completely left behind the concept of understanding itself (in both its 
ontological and epistemological sense), and together with it the dimension of 
hermeneutics # which he may have felt as being subjective. 
 
V. 3. Resuming our original subject and at the same time continuing the results of 
former analyses, we may say: against Heidegger's concept of time, time conceived in 
terms of the a priori of a priori, an objection greatly similar to those outlined above # 
related to the meanings of the concepts of truth, history, and understanding # can be 
formulated. Applying it to our case, the question is the possibility, plausibility of 
!bridging" the gap between the traditional and Heideggerian use of the concept of time. 
Is there not between them no less !infinite difference"X That Heidegger used the concept 
of time in an unusual way # radically different from the greatest part of the tradition # 
would be # perhaps # here acceptable; but the (hermeneutical) situation once again is 
characterized by the fact that he tried to derive the traditional concept of time (called by 
him vulgar) from his own time concept, that is, he tried to connect the two notions. The 
dilemma # in the final analysis and in a sharpened formulation # consists of the fact that 
Heidegger named and expanded on his concept in question as a time concept (in the 
                                                                                                                                    
erkenntnistheoretischen, bzw. dieser sei ein Derivat jenesX Ist der Unterschied nicht ein 
'unendlicher'X" As here I raise the possibility of applying a critical objection directed by 
Heidegger against Descartes on Heidegger himself, the discussion continues with further 
elaboration on this issue; see ibid. 104#107. 
1 BT 123 (= SZ 20 §, 92: !Jedes Seiende, das nicht Gott ist, ist ens creatum. Zwischen beiden be-
steht ein »unendlicher« Unterschied ihres Seins, und doch sprechen wir das Geschaffene ebenso 
wie den Schöpfer als Seiende an. Wir gebrauchen demnach Sein in einer Weite, daß sein Sinn 
einen »unendlichen« Unterschied umgreift.") 
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other two mentioned cases: as concepts of understanding and history). If a notion has to 
encompass an !infinite difference", this leads up to a difficulty which can hardly be 
overcome. But if it has not this task, that raises new, different difficulties. An aporia, an 
unsolvable situation is being created. In both cases the difficulty originates from the 
scarcity (or lack) of language. 
 The philosopher either refers his use of concepts to the tradition, and in this case 
he may come to use his basic concepts in a sense !infinitely" different from the 
traditional: the difficulty in this case arises from the necessity to bridge the gap between 
the infinitely different elements, to join them; or # trying to solve this difficulty # he 
may decide to give up referring them to the tradition, he dissolves the connection, thus 
pushing his own theme into namelessness. This # retracting # step was taken only (as far 
as I can see) related to the concept of truth in the discussed cases (I leave now 
Heidegger's retraction of his earlier reduction of space to time without discussion.) . The 
question concerning aletheia as uncealment, the late Heidegger claimed, is not identical 
with the question concerning truth; thus he removed the dilemma of the !infinite 
difference" # the dilemma of building a bridge between the two concepts, together with 
the necessity of doing so. But if aletheia is not identical with truth, then what is it and 
how can it be identifiedX For aletheia has become a philosophically relevant subject # 
before anything else and first of all # in relation to the interpretation of truth. If we 
loosen or dissolve this relation, what are we going to call that which remainsX Language 
in one case must encompass an !infinite difference", in the other it cannot find # more 
precisely, it gives up # the adequate word, and has to remain silent. This dilemma, as far 
as I can see, is one of the basic dilemmas of Heidegger's thought # if not of philosophy 
itself. (And we have not even mentioned one of Heidegger's basic concepts, Being. The 
relationship between this and the similar # or apparently similar # questions and 
questionings of the tradition could only be discussed in detail in a separate study. Let us 
anyway refer briefly to the fact that if the concept of time compared to the question of 
Being must go through a radical change which results in a new time concept, then this 
also holds true to the concept of Being related to time, which, compared to the 
traditional notions of Being, must also be new # and at the same time related to the 
tradition.1) 
 
V. 4. I have quoted above (at the beginning of part V. 2.) Otto Pöggeler warning # 
completely justifiably # that in Heidegger's expression, history of Being, !that which is 
called [...] here history must strictly be differentiated from that which we call history 
otherwise, namely from that area of the being which, for example, is usually opposed to 
nature." Pöggeler made similar observations # with reference to the correct 
understanding of Heidegger's use of concepts # on other occasions as well; from the 
point of view of our subject it is most relevant that one of these referred to the a priori. 
Nevertheless, here observation and warning # differently from the former case # were 
not formulated neutrally but were accompanied by criticism. Considering the fact that 
our analysis so far claimed that we have to deal with a real but not easily solvable 
dilemma, we would not go that far as Otto Pöggeler, when he formulated this # in my 
opinion theoretical and philosophically unsolvable # difficulty as an objection against 
Heidegger. !If Heidegger", Pöggeler observed, !connects the traditional discussion of 
                                                 
1 See for this note 1 on page 15. 
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the <a priori' to some kind of earlier being and by this to time, then he overlooks the fact 
that philosophy has become aware of the metaphorical aspects contained by this and has 
deconstructed them".1 This objection seems all the less justified as Heidegger had 
already !deconstructed" the pejorative meaning of !metaphor" on which Pöggeler tacitly 
constructed his critique. (Of course, the excellent Heidegger scholar was obviously 
perfectly aware of this, but for a moment seemed to have left it out of consideration.)2 
On the other hand, if the argumentation claims that the !earlier being" can only be 
connected to time metaphorically, then it tacitly commits itself (has always already 
committed itself) to some kind of a literal, exact meaning of time # in a certain sense 
borrowed (naturally: dogmatically, without questioning it and questioning behind it) 
from the course of the tradition. This prior commitment, however, forms an impediment 
to Heidegger's own question concerning time # and to !being and time" #, that is, it 
distances itself from this question before facing and thematizing it properly. If my 
metacritical argumentation is not wholly unfounded then it removes an important 
conceptual obstacle from the way of referring the a priori and time mutually to one 
another. Thereby the question concerning the a priori becomes open towards its possible 
connection to the concept of time # understood and thematized in some new sense. 
 
V. 5. By way of conclusion of this part let us resume our initial, starting questions. If a 
philosopher uses a concept in a new, unusual sense # this has been our starting claim #, 
then any objection referring to some traditional # usual, long standing # sense of the 
notion in question could far too easily be repelled with the observation: !I use the 
concept in another sense". Thus one can evade any comparison and criticism. On the 
other hand, we have observed that if we contested the philosophers' right to use 
traditional expressions in a new, unusual sense, then we would question their freedom 
and together with it the freedom of philosophy; thereby we would eventually end up in 
putting an end to philosophy. We would make ab ovo impossible the formulation of 
new, so far unobserved questions, problems, we would impede new discoveries. 
 The fact that philosophers try to expound on their discoveries related # in some 
cases critically # to some traditional concept points to the procedure which Heidegger, 
after his hermeneutical turn following World War I, called destruction.3 The destructive 
work is directed to the basic concepts of the philosophical world view and it is carried 
out with the aim of winning back, reappropriating these ideas in a  creative and living 
manner. The theoretical difficulties and limits of destruction can be illustrated with a 
computer-analogy. It is a well-known fact that operating files cannot be scanned for 
                                                 
1 Otto Pöggeler, !Zeit und Hermeneutik", in Pöggeler, Schritte zu einer hermeneutischen Philoso-
phie (Freiburg/München: Alber, 1994), 115#141, here 135: !Wenn Heidegger auch die traditionelle 
Rede vom »Apriori« auf ein Frühersein und damit auf Zeit festlegt, verkennt er, daß das 
Philosophieren die hier liegende Metaphorik bewußt gemacht und abgearbeitet hat." 
2 Related to Heidegger's view on metaphor see István M. Fehér, !Létezik-e szó szerinti jelentésX" 
(Is There a Literary SenseX), Világosság ^LVII, no. 8#9#10 (2006), 185#196, here especially 
190 ff. Online: http://www.vilagossag.hu/pdf/20070507214049.pdf.  
3 For more detail on what follows see István M. Fehér, !Destrukció és applikáció avagy a 
filozófia mint »saját korának filozófiája«. Történelem és történetiség Heidegger és Gadamer gon-
dolkodásában" (Destruction and Application or Philosophy as <the Philosophy of Its Own Age'. 
History and Historicity in Heidegger's and Gadamer's Thinking), Világosság ^LIII, no. 4#7 
(2002), 19#33. See online: http://www.vilagossag.hu./pdf/20030704121036.pdf. 
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viruses. The program which performs the scanning # at least while it is scanning # 
cannot be scanned itself, it cannot be subjected to questioning. The antivirus program 
cannot scan itself reliably. The starting point of the procedure destruction#
reappropriation # the demand for new, fresh access to things # evades investigation. It 
does so because investigation starts from it; it happens and is carried out with and 
through it; that is, presupposing it.1 Most probably, its efficiency # what and how it can 
reveal and make accessible in the course of its progressive deconstructing#reacquiring 
work # can only be measured on this. Besides deconstruction, Heidegger used for this 
procedure the expression !loosening" (?Abbau") as well. If we have loosened the basic 
concepts of the metaphysical tradition and world view # that is, if we have indeed made 
them accessible for new questioning and acquiring # then it is no longer possible for us 
to reject Heidegger's time analysis !a priori" ($) # and here this means: without, !prior" 
to a thorough critical confrontation with the texts # on the account that we know (from 
tradition or from anywhere else, in any case, we know stably and for good) what time is. 
 The crucial point in Heidegger's argumentation # as in any philosophical 
argumentation # is its starting point, or premise which I have reconstructed above2 thus: 
!...<earlier'/<former' is a temporal determination (since <earlier', <former' obviously 
means <earlier' in time, <former' in time)..." Concerning this formulation the objection 
can be raised that this definition tacitly already presupposes exactly that which is a 
question itself, namely that !<earlier'/<former' is a temporal determination". This can 
only be accepted, the argumentation continues, if we already draw on a time concept 
which differs from the tradition # maybe even Heidegger's own idea. (We have 
formulated this somewhat later in the text: !That which precedes any earlier or later is 
nothing else than time # of course, time taken in the ontological and not in its vulgar or 
subjective sense.") If, however, we abide by the traditional concept of time, then we can 
respond to this: why would !<earlier', <former' obviously" mean !<earlier' in time, 
<former' in time"X It is not at all so # not at all obvious$ This expression conceals, but 
anyway skips the difficulty. We have to deal with the appearance of an argument, but 
not with a real argument. 
 This critical objection is most probably correct. But its author also conceals 
something, and in his case we have likewise to deal with the appearance of arguments 
rather than with arguments. The starting point is eventually the readiness # or the lack of 
readiness # to re-examine the traditional concept of time. Whether we can hear or not 
the temporal determination in !earlier" turns on our way of listening: that is, on the time 
                                                 
1 The hermeneutical deconstruction#reacquisition is also carried out from the ground of tradition; 
it can hardly be claimed that it is above history. But this does not at all mean that it is safe from 
criticism. See on this Robert Sokolowski, !Gadamer's Theory of Hermeneutics", in The 
Philosophy of Hans-Georg Gadamer, The Library of Living Philosophers, vol. ^^IV, ed. Lewis 
E. Hahn, (LaSalle, Il.: Open Court Publishing, 1997), 223#236, here 227: !We cannot stand 
outside all traditions and evaluate them from no committed point of view; the desire for such an 
inhuman and detached perspective is another of the misleading hopes of rationalism and the 
Enlightenment"). Cf. further G. B. Madison, !Hermeneutics: Gadamer and Ricoeur", in 
Twentieth-Century Continental Philosophy, ed. R. Kearney (Routledge History of Philosophy, 
vol. VIII) (London # New York: Routledge, 1994), 290#349, here 319: !the fact that we stand 
always within tradition and cannot, for that reason, criticize everything at once, does not mean 
that there are things that cannot be criticized, as a cultural conservative might maintain".  
2 See point II, the context of note 5 on page 14. 
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concept we tacitly keep # always already (so to say !a priori") # in mind, on the time 
concept we compare this demand to. This previous understanding decides on the 
acceptance or rejection of the demand (and this prior understanding cannot be 
suspended, it always functions in one direction or another). We arrive to an either#or 
which does not allow for an argumentative answer # in either case #, for this is the 
choice of the absolute starting point. If we abide by tradition, it is not obvious that in 
!earlier" a time determination is inherent, and Heidegger's way of putting the question 
and his starting point can summarily be rejected. If, however, we show readiness or 
openness to break with the tradition, to re-examine its senses of words (the readiness to 
hermeneutical destruction, to the critical re-examination, to the reappropriation of 
tradition consists exactly in this), then we do not have to refrain ab ovo (!a priori") from 
outlining a new, unusual time concept. And this, if it is the case, could start from the 
observation that a time determination is lies implicit in !earlier", !former". 
 Heidegger in each of the above mentioned and analyzed cases used certain basic 
concepts of his thinking and at the same time of the philosophical tradition # the a priori 
concepts of truth, history, understanding, and time # in an unusual, new sense (the 
unusual, new meanings, however, in each case started from some traditional sense). Was 
this justifiedX Did all this result from the originality, or from the arbitrariness of his 
thinkingX We leave the answer open at this point. Last but not least we cannot be sure 
with regard to the very fact whether our questioning touched  upon the real issues or not.  
 
VI. 
I should like to end this paper with a somewhat subjective observation. The conclusion 
of the Heidegger lecture course held in 1927, entitled The Basic Problems of 
Phenomenology # published as volume 24 of the collected works #, where the above 
reconstructed observations on the relationship between the a priori and time appear, 
contains a formulation which seemed to me strangely familiar when I reread the text this 
time and I was glad to hace come across it. This formulation says: !Die Phänomenologie 
gibt es nicht, und wenn es sie geben könnte, dann würde sie nie zu so etwas wie einer 
philosophischen Technik werden [The phenomenology does not exist, but even if it 
existed, it could not become some kind of a philosophical technique]."1 After some 
efforts I realized that the passage did not seem familiar because I remembered it # 
although there are Heidegger texts which I recall, and this could have been one of them, 
since it was one of the first Heidegger texts I have read #, but because I myself used a 
similar formulation once, moreover with similar emphasis # related to hermeneutics. In 
the mid 1990s I wrote an article in German entitled Gibt es die Hermeneutik?, in which I 
questioned # or at least made questionable # the existence of !the hermeneutics". 
Among other things I wrote: !aus der Sicht philosophischer Hermeneutik, die Herme-
neutik als solche, d.h. so etwas wie den (allgemeinen oder einheitlichen) Begriff der 
Hermeneutik, überhaupt nicht gibt, überhaupt nicht geben kann" [!from the perspective 
of philosophical hermeneutics [...] there is not [...] and there cannot be such a thing as 
the hermeneutics (the concept of hermeneutics, its general or unified concept)"].2 
                                                 
1 GA 24, 467. 
2 István M. Fehér, !Gibt es die HermeneutikX Zur Selbstreflexion und Aktualität der Hermeneutik 
Gadamerscher Prägung", in Internationale Zeitschrift für Philosophie, hrsg. G. Figal, E. Rudolph 
(Stuttgart: Metzler Verlag), Jg. V, 1996, Heft 2, 236#259, here 251. In Hungarian see 
!Hermeneutika és problématörténet # avagy létezik-e »a« hermeneutikaX A gadameri 
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 When I wrote this article, more than ten years had past since I had read volume 
24 of Heidegger's complete works, and this Heidegger passage did not linger in my 
mind, at least I cannot remember it, and the text itself does not contain any kind of 
reference to it either. I tried to question the existence of !the" hermeneutics based on 
independent arguments, irrespective of Heidegger's questioning about phenomenology 
and of the context of this questioning. Be as it may, I should like to recommend now the 
following theses as conclusions worth considering: if the hermeneutics does not exist, 
and according to Heidegger neither does the phenomenology, then a third thesis could 
be added to these two, namely that the analytic philosophy does not exist either. If all 
these do not exist, what does then remainX What does exist at allX # one may ask. A 
possible answer could be: what remains is the philosophy or (as Heidegger liked to 
express it) the philosophical investigation, research, philosophizing, looking things in 
the face in an effort to appropriate and reappropriate them.1 
 




                                                                                                                                    
hermeneutika önreflexiója és aktualitásának néhány vonása" (Hermeneutics and History of 
Problems # Or Does <the' Hermeneutics ExistX The Self-Reflection of the Gadamerian 
Hermeneutics and Some Aspects of Its Timeliness), in István M. Fehér, Hermeneutikai 
tanulmányok I (Hermeneutical Studies I) (Budapest: L'Harmattan, 2001), 66; see also ibid. 78 ff.: 
!From a hermeneutical perspective (that is from the perspective of philosophical hermeneutics) 
the question <what is !hermeneutics"X' according to what we have said so far is impossible, 
because it lacks motivation, that is, it is a freely floating question. On this view, it also remains # 
it must remain # a question whether the hermeneutics # the hermeneutics as such, and the 
philosophical hermeneutics as such (as stars in the sky) # does (do) and can exist at all." 
1 See for example SZ 2, 7, 9 ff., 11; GA 56/67, 212; GA 61, 3, 8, 24. (!Der Weg ist weit für die 
Philosophie als Forschung"), 29 (!konkrete Forschung"), 182 ff., 187 ff., 190 ff., 193 ff. 
(!phänomenologische Forschung", !phänomenologische und geisteswissenschaftliche 
Forschung", Philosophie !als radikale Forschung"); GA 62, 329, 347 (!philosophische 
Forschung"), 348 ff., etc. Further on GA 27, 15 (!Philosophie = Philosophieren"); GA 29/30, 6 
(!Philosophie ist Philosophieren"), etc. 
